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ABSTRACT
This paper provides evidence on the wealth effects of equity for debt
exchanges. For our sample of 150 transactions, we examined the abnormal
returns to stockholders, and to the holders of four classes of senior
securities. Common stockholders earn significantly negative abnormal
returns at the first announcement of an exchange, and also during the
interval from the announcement through the day the exchange is completed.
The evidence does not support the existence of wealth transfers between
classes of security holders; the results do indicate, however, that firm
value decreases in response to the exchange announcement. The negative
abnormal returns to common stock are related to the size of the new equity
issued in the exchange, however, the price pressure effect does not explain
the total decline in common stock prices. The sample is partitioned into
pure capital structure change, and those where cash was used along with
equity, and there are notable differences in the results for these groups.
Our results are consistent with previous studies which have found common
stock price changes to be of the 3ame sign as the change in leverage.
Unlike previous studies, however, we find the negative revaluation of the
common stock to be only temporary.
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EQUITY FOR DEHT EXCHANGES and SECURITY RETURNS:
Further Evidence on the Wealth Effects of a
Capital Structure Change
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the effects of equity for debt exchanges on the
security returns of exchanging firms. In such transactions, the ex-
changing firm retires outstanding low-coupon (discount) debt by issuing
new equity or a combination of new equity and cash. The immediate ef-
fects of the exchange are a one-time boost in accounting earnings, and a
reduction in financial leverage, and according to the financial press,
these effects have led to the sudden popularity of equity for debt ex-
changes. Despite these apparent benefits, there are a number of other
effects which may adversely affect the value of the firm, and it is im-
portant to study the valuation impact of these transactions on all
classes of security holders.
An equity for debt exchange alters the firm's financing mix by re-
placing low cost debt with new equity, dilutes the ownership position of
shareholders, and may change the asset mix when cash is used in the ex-
change. This combination of effects will result in different relative
priorities of claims to the firm's cash flows, and may signal informa-
tion about the firm to the capital markets. Moreover, the tax-preferred
treatment of the transactions may allow the firm to satisfy sinking fund
requirements at a lower after-tax cost. Each of these factors may af-
fect security prices differentially, and we attempt to identify those
Since August, 1981, there have been more than 200 equity for debt ex-
changes.
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which are predominant in overall security price changes.
The analysis of equity for debt exchanges also provides evidence on
several related issues in corporate finance. Fir3t, an exchange de-
creases financial leverage, and thu3 provides an opportunity to examine
new evidence on the relationship between capital structure and firm val-
2
ue. Second, an exchange results in reduced debt service requirements;
the evidence will indicate if this change results in wealth transfers
from equity to senior securities in response to the new relative priori-
ties of claims. Third, the results of this study will provide new evi-
dence on the relative importance of accounting earnings versus cash
flow, and the potential conflict between managerial goals and those of
shareholders. 3 Finally, this study will provide evidence on the reaction
of common stock prices to an increased supply of shares.
In the next section of the paper, we discuss the background materi-
al which is relevant. Included in the section are a discussion of the
recent tax law changes which have motivated the resurgence of equity for
debt exchanges, and a discussion of the valuation implications of the
transactions. The data and methodology used to analyze the daily secur-
ity returns are detailed in Sections 3 and 4, and the results of the
analysis are presented in Section 5. The results include the daily ab-
normal returns to common stockholders around the announcement of the ex-
change, and the daily risk-adjusted returns on four classes of senior
securities. We also provide evidence on the price pressure hypothesis,
2
Masulis (1980a,b), Mikkelson (1981), Dann (1981), and Dann and Mikkel-
- son (1983) have examined this relationship by focusing on other finan-
cial transactions.
3
Both thi3 point and the one previous are agency issues which were
first discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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and compare the results for pure capital structure changes to those
where cash was used along with new equity. Finally, in Section 6, we
summarize the findings.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 The Regulatory Environment
Equity for debt exchanges affect both the income statement and the
balance sheet. As mentioned, the transaction results in a decrease in
financial leverage and an increase in accounting earnings for the cur-
rent period. The increased earnings result from the 'gain' on the
transaction defined as the difference between the market and the par
values of the exchanged bond(s). Under current accounting provisions, a
firm may include the entire gain as ordinary income, subject to materi-
ality discretion. Furthermore, under current tax laws, the entire gain
from such a transaction is tax-free. The combined effect of the ac-
counting and tax treatment of equity for debt exchanges has allowed many
firms to report positive accounting earnings when they would have other-
wise reported a loss for the period. Despite the apparently beneficial
accounting effects of an exchange, there were very few such transactions
prior to August, 1981. Several recent changes in tax legislation may
explain the sudden popularity of the exchanges.
The goal of taking the excess of par over market value of discount
bonds as a tax-free gain is not new. Until recently, the repurchase of
discount bonds provided a strategy to accomplish this goal, because the
gain on repurchase could be used to reduce the tax basis of existing as-
sets. By reducing the tax basis of long-lived, non-depreciable assets,
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the tax on the gain could be deferred indefinitely. The Bankruptcy Tax
Act, which was effective January 1 , 1 98 1 , limited the applicability of
the basis reduction to depreciable assets, thereby precluding the use of
discount bond repurchases to generate tax-free gains. The same tax leg-
islation, however, provided the conditions under which equity for debt
14
exchanges could provide the same tax-free gains. The first equity for
debt exchange was completed in August, 1981, and since that date, there
have been approximately 200 such transactions.
Another potential motivation for the sudden popularity of these
transactions was the availability of new tax shields provided by the Ec-
onomic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) ex-
e
amined the impact of tax shield substitutes for debt, and concluded
that, to the extent that an optimal capital structure does exist and tax
shield substitutes are increased, then firms which were at the optimal
level will be motivated to reduce debt. This would enable those firms
to avoid paying the bondholder's surplus on that portion of their debt
which came to provide a reduced tax shield because of the new substi-
tutes. The Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) and safe harbor
4
Although the repurchase of discount debt lost its preferred tax status
in January, 1981, it was not until mid-1981 when an investment banker
discovered the loophole which allowed the exchanges to accomplish the
same goals. While the IRS has not yet ruled- on the tax status of the
exchanges, it is generally considered that these transactions qualify
as non-taxable recapitalizations if (i) a third party (usually an in-
vestment banking firm) takes an at risk position in the securities to
be retired, and (ii) the common stock issued represents a material
portion, frequently interpreted as 50% , of the market value of the
debt retired.
5
The criteria to be met before a firm would undertake an equity for
debt exchange in this environment may explain why not all firms have
done so. The criteria are (i) the firm be at an optimal level of lev-
erage initially, (ii) it chooses to employ the new tax shield, and
(iii) that, by so doing, it will lose some debt tax shield.
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leasing provisions of £RTA are examples of new tax shields which may
have been substituted for currently existing interest shields.
2.2 Valuation Implications
While the financial press has focused on the cosmetic effects of an
equity for debt exchange, the overall valuation implications of such an
exchange are not clear from a theoretical perspective. These trans-
actions represent a tradeoff among a number of factors which affect firm
value differentially, and it is difficult to predict which of those fac-
tors will dominate. Previous studies of capital structure change have
identified and discussed in detail the various factors, and the predict-
ed wealth effects of each on different classes of security holders. We
shall briefly discuss only those which are most pertinent to this study.
Tax effects . Because of the lower level of- detit outstanding -after the
exchange, the firm's interest tax shield, and thereby, its after-tax
cash flows are reduced. This should result in lower values for all of
the firm's securities.
Changes in priority of outstanding claims
. An exchange results in sen-
ior claims to the firms' cash flows being replaced by residual claims,
thereby enhancing both the absolute and relative priority of all senior
security holders.
Increase in the number of shares outstanding
. The exchange results in a
significant number of new shares being offered in the market on the
—pricing date. There are "twcr potential valuation implications here, (i)
current shareholder positions are diluted, and (ii) to the extent that, a
price pressure or supply effect exists, a decline in common stock prices
could result.
See Masulis (1980a), Table 1, p. 146; Dann (1981), Table 1, p. 118;
Vermaelen (1981), pp. 140-141; and especially Mikkel3on (1981), pp.
239-243 and Table 1.
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Information effects . The announcement of an equity for debt exchange
could send conflicting signals to investors. Since a number of the
firms in our sample U3ed the exchange to manufacture a large proportion
of their periodic earnings, an exchange might be indicative of a limited
existing and future investment opportunity set which would provide a
negative signal. Conversely, a firm may use the exchange to meet sink-
ing fund payments , and because of the tax-preferred nature of the trans-
action, reduce the cost of this requirement.
Most previous studies of capital structure change have found a po-
sitive relationship between the change in equity value and the direction
of the change in financial leverage. Dann (1981) examined the impact of
common stock repurchases on the wealth of security holders, and found
that the announcement of a repurchase is associated with significant po-
sitive returns to common stock. He attributed the value change to the
information signals of the transaction. Vermaelen (1981) also examined
the impact of repurchases and, like Dann, found a permanent increase in
equity value. Vermaelen also concluded that the information effects
were dominant. in the stock price reaction, and he explicitly rejected
the alternative tax and expropriation hypotheses.
In common stock repurchases, the firm experiences a simultaneous
change in both assets and capital structure; in contrast, the conversion
of debt and preferred stock into common does not result in a change in
asset structure. Mikkelson (1981) examined the wealth effects of such
pure capital structure changes. He found that the decrease in financial
leverage resulted in a decrease in both equity and firm value, however,
7
Dunn and Spatt (1983) speculate that sinking fund considerations may
be a key explanatory variable in the sudden popularity of equity for
debt exchanges.
"g
An exception to this empirical regularity i3 reported in Dann and Mik-
kelson (1983). They examine the issuance of convertible debt which is
a leverage increasing transaction, and find that it is associated with
negative returns to common stock.
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the decrease in value is found only in the case of debt conversion and
Mikkelson interprets this finding to suggest that the cause is the re-
Q
duction in the corporate tax shield.
3. THE SAMPLE OF EQUITY FOR DEBT EXCHANGES
3.1 Common Stock
The sample of transactions for this study includes equity for debt
exchanges in 1 93 1 and 1982 by firms which met the following criteria:
1) the firm's stock returns be available in the CRSP daily returns
file.
2) the equity for debt exchange has an identifiable announcement
date.
3) no other major firm-specific events occurred within 50 trading
days of the exchange.
The Wall Street Journal Index and the original Wall Street Journal arti-
cles were reviewed to make certain that each of the transactions met the
above criteria. These selection criteria resulted in a final sample of
150 equity for debt transactions undertaken by 119 firms. Characteris-
tics of the sample are presented in Table 1.
Three event related dates were identified for each transaction.
The date the first announcement of the exchange appeared in The Wall
Street Journal is defined as the announcement date (day 0). The second
date of interest i3 the date on which the new shares were registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.), defined as the
.g
The exchange transactions analyzed in this paper include both pure
capital structure changes, where only equity is exchanged for debt,
and mixed exchanges, where both equity and cash are exchanged. The
mixed exchanges, like the repurchases, result in changes in both lev-
erage and asset mix.
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filing date. Typically, the filing elate preceded tne announcement date
by one or more trading days. Finally, the pricing date is defined as
the day when the firm actually issues the new shares to the investment
banker. The terms of the transaction are established by the market
prices on that day, and uncertainty about the transaction is not re-
solved until the pricing date. The pricing date was generally the last
of the three dates, although there were some cases where it was coinci-
dent with the announcement date.
3.2 Senior Securities
We also analyzed senior securities for 87 of the 119 firms which
participated in the 150 exchanges. The criteria for inclusion of a sen-
ior security were that it be publicly traded, and that it trade with
sufficient frequency to apply the senior security methodology. Our fi-
nal sample of senior securities includes 230 straight bonds, 41 convert-
ible bonds, 51 straight preferred stocks, and 16 convertible preferred
stocks. This sample of senior securities is large relative to previous
studies; this provides us with an opportunity to examine potential
wealth transfers between security classes, and to draw statistically re-
liable conclusions.
We thank CompuServe, Inc. for providing the senior security price
data.
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4. METHODOLOGY
4. 1 Common Stock Returns
Security returns were examined over an event period which extends
from 50 trading days before the announcement date (day 0) to 30 trading
days after. The market model is estimated over the period from t=-200
to t=-51, and the ordinary least squares coefficient estimates are de-
noted as 5 and p. The prediction error for security j on day t is de-
fined as
PE.
t
= R., - (3t. + B.R ) (1)
Jt jt J J cat
where:
R = the rate of return for security j on day t, and
Jt
R t = the value-weighted return for the market portfolio on day t.mt
For each trading day t, the average prediction error is
N
t
PE. = 1/N. Z PE.. (2)
t t j=1 Jt
where
N = the number of securities with a prediction error defined on
day t.
The cumulative average prediction error through day T is defined a3
CPE. = £ PE/ . (3)
ts-50 w
The cumulative average prediction error over the interval from t. to t-
inclusive is
CPEt1,t2 Jfc PE t
(U)
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wnere the interval has length L = t
-t +1, reflecting the requirement
that t does net precede t in event time.
The analysis of the significance of the PE.^'s and their cumulation
J-
over defined intervals uses the methodology of Dodd and Warner (1983).
The test-statistic employed is the mean standardized cumulative pre-
diction error. For a specific interval L = t.., ...,t_., this te3t-
statistic is
T
2j (5)X (PW ' ^TT^n ; 1 •SCPE, t=T,
J lj
s is defined as follows
J «*
_
2
2 '
(Rmt-V
3
Jt
= (Sj (Ul/Dj ))l/2 (6)
j (R ,.< -I ) 2
m
t- 5
m!
where s^ is' the residual variance for security J from the market model
regression,
D. is the number of observations during the observation period,
R is the rate of return on the market index for day t,
mt
R is the mean rate of return on the market index during the es-
timation period, and
R ' is the rate of return on the market index for day t of the
Bit .... .
estimation period.
For a portfolio of N securities, the test-statistic is
N
z = e scpe / yjr. (7)
which is distributed unit normal since each standardized prediction er-
ror, PE /s. k , is assumed to be distributed unit normal in the absence
of abnormal performance. The interval over which SCPE is calculated,
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of abnormal performance. The interval over which SCPE
. is calculated,
L,, can be of equal or different length across securities. When the in-
terval is equal, we analyze security performance for all firms relative
to one of the three event dates and refer to this as the 'event day'
technique. The event day analysis may lead to cross-sectional inconsis-
tency because of the multiple event dates, and the fact that uncertainty
about the transaction is resolved over intervals which vary from firm to
firm. In order to overcome this inconsistency, we also utilize an 'e-
vent interval' analysis, where L. is firm specific.
4.2 Senior Securities
The methodology used to analyze senior security returns is de-
scribed in Hite and Owers ( 1 983 ) - The daily return is assumed to have a
2
normal distribution with a constant mean,y
,
and variance, a Because of
the relatively infrequent trading of some senior securities, an n-day
return for security j is defined as
R ..(n) - S(nJJ ,na ).
The return relates to a trade on day t after n-1 non-trading days.
We analyze senior security returns over the interval t=-10,+10 rel-
ative to the announcement date (day 0). For a given security, the mean
and variance of the distribution are estimated over t= -50,-11. If a
security trades on t after n-1 non-trading days, then the security re-
turn is a single observation, but an n-day return. An unbiased estimate
of the return on day t is R,.(n)/n, and thus prediction errors are de-
For example, with the event day (day 0) defined as the announcement
date, at day +3 some firms will be past their pricing while others
will not yet have reached that date.
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fined as
?E jt = R jt (n) " ni! (8)
where the event period is from -10 to +10, and n is equal to (greater
than) one if j trades (does not trade) on day t-1. The daily average
prediction error (PE ) is as defined above, and the standardized pre-
diction error for security j on day t is defined as
SPEjt = PEjt / s/rf . (9)
where s
. is the estimated standard deviation of the return on senior se-
curity j over the estimation interval (-50,-11). As in the equity meth-
odology, the mean standardized cumulative prediction error, SCPE is
used for statistical tests, with the security included only on days when
it trades.
5. RESULTS
5. 1 Equity Returns : Complete Sample
5.1.1 Event Day Methodology
In Table 2, we report the daily mean prediction errors and the cu-
mulative mean prediction errors (CPE) for event days -50 through +30.
Figure 1 is a plot of the CPE over the same period. The mean cumulative
prediction errors for various intervals around the announcement date,
and the corresponding test-statistics are reported in Table 3- The CPE
over the 50 days ending with the announcement is -0.0089, and the test-
statistic indicates that it is not significant. There are significant
changes, however, during the ten days around the announcement of the ex-
change. In fact, the CPE is close to the maximum pre-event level on day
-5, but then negative daily prediction errors for days -4 through day
- 12 -
cause the CPE to decline to -0.0089 on day 0, which is its lowest value
during the entire 81 day event period.
The event day technique provides evidence that the announcement of
an equity for debt exchange is associated with significantly negative
returns to shareholders. The individual day test-statistics for days
-2,-1 and are -2.63, —4 . 19 , and -4.90, respectively, and these are the
largest of any of the daily prediction errors. The two-day announcement
period prediction error is -0.0128 with a test-statistic of -7.18. In
Table 4, we report the sample distribution of the two-day cumulative
prediction errors; and while there is wide variation in the cross-sec-
tion, it is clear than, on average, the announcement is associated with
negative returns. In our sample, 103 transactions ( 68
- 7% ) were associ-
ated with negative two-day excess returns.
The negative returns which are associated with the announcement are
then reversed in the post-event period. The sum of the daily prediction
errors for days +1 to +10 is 0.0145 (test-statistic, 3-35), with 0.0135
of that total occurring during event days +6 through +10. The positive
trend continues through day +30 when the sum of the daily prediction er-
rors is 0.0117, the maximum for the 81 day period of analysis. We find
the post-event increase curious, and will discuss it further in a later
section of the paper.
Our results are quite similar to those reported in several recent
12papers. Although the samples and methods of analysis were different,
each of the papers reported a significantly negative price reaction at
12
In Rogers and Owers (1983)» we report results on a sample of firms
which exchanged stock for debt in 198l. Subsequent to the completion
of this research, we became aware of studies of equity for debt swaps
by Finnerty (1983), Woolridge (1983), and Peavey and "Scott 11983).
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the announcement, followed by a post-event reversal.
5.1.2 Event Interval Methodology
Further evidence of the negative effect of the announcement of an
exchange is provided by the event interval technique. The difficulty
and importance of identifying the announcement date with precision in
any event study is well known, J and is especially pertinent in the case
of these exchanges since there were three key dates for each, and the
uncertainty regarding the terms of the exchange was not resolved until
the pricing date. In the majority of cases, the first announcement in
the financial press followed by one or more days the filing with S.E.C.,
and one could argue, therefore, that the press announcement was not the
appropriate day 0. The event interval technique allows us to examine
prediction errors during any interval surrounding the exchange. We de-
fine the interval as extending from the earliest of the filing or an-
nouncement date to the pricing date. This interval varied by firm from
a minimum of one day to a maximum of 21 days. The mean event interval
for the 150 firms in the sample was 4.33 days.
In Table 5, we report the results of this phase of the analysis.
The event interval cumulative prediction errors have a sample mean of
-0.0150 (test-statistic, -5.67), and range from a maximum of 0.1047 to a
minimum of -0.1245. Of the 150 transactions, 100 were associated with
negative event interval prediction errors. These results clearly sup-
port those of the event day methodology, and provide stronger evidence
of this negative common stock price reaction to an exchange announce-
1
3
See Brown and Warner (1983).
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merit.
5.2 Equity Returns and Size of the Exchange
The pattern of cumulative prediction errors during the 81 day event
interval is somewhat puzzling. The negative price reaction associated
with the announcement has been described, as has the post-event rever-
sal. The CPE reaches a level of 0.0117 on day +30, with the majority of
the increase occurring between days +5 and +26. The pattern is puzz-
ling in that the negative wealth effect of the exchanges appears to be
transitory, since the announcement causes only a brief discontinuity in
the generally positive trend of the cumulative prediction errors. The
previous studies of capital structure changes have found the announce-
ments to cause a one-time revaluation of the equity, with no significant
post-event reversal.
A possible explanation of the excess returns pattern observed in
this study is the price pressure hypothesis discussed by Scholes (1972),
Marsh (1979), and recently, by Asquith and Mullins (1983). This hy-
pothesis asserts that newly issued shares create a supply /demand imba-
lance, and that those additional shares must therefore be sold at a dis-
count. Furthermore, the size of the discount is a positive function of
the size of the issue. Equity for debt exchanges have characteristics
similar to secondary distributions, and if the newly issued shares did
14
During this 21-day interval, there are four statistically significant
positive average prediction errors, and only seven days with negative
average prediction errora.
1
5
Scholes reported the average proportion of the firm traded in his
sample to be 0.0216; the average proportion of equity exchange in our
sample is 0.0210.
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cause a supply imbalance, a pattern of excess returns similar to that
observed here might result.
Previous studies of the price pressure hypothesis have produced
conflicting results. Neither Scholes nor Mar3h found evidence to sup-
port the existence of a price pressure effect in studies of secondary
issues and primary issues, respectively. The recent study by Asquith
and Mullins, however, reports a significantly negative relationship be-
tween the announcement day prices and the size of the equity offering,
providing support for the price pressure effect.
In order to test this hypothesis, we examined the relationship be-
tween the event interval cumulative prediction error, and the size of
each transaction. The regression results are presented in Table 6. The
ordinary least squares coefficient on the size variable is negative in
sign, but not significant. Examination of the residuals from the re-
gression indicated that heteroscedasticity was present, and the regres-
sion was therefore re-estimated using weighted least squares. The
weights utilized were the inverse of the standard errors of the event-
interval prediction errors for each security. The weighted least square
approach provided an overall improvement in the fit of the estimation
2
equation, as indicated by the adjusted R . Furthermore, the negative
relationship between size and the cumulative prediction error is strong-
er, and the test-statistic is marginally significant. This result indi-
cates that price pressure may have caused some of the decline in stock
prices during the interval, however, the magnitude of the price pressure
effect is not sufficient to explain the total decline in stock prices.
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5.3 Senior Security Returns
We next examine whether the losses to shareholders are merely
wealth transfers to the holders of bonds and/or other senior securities.
Given the decrease in financial leverage, such a positive revaluation of
senior securities might be expected because of the lower expected bank-
ruptcy cost3, the change in relative priority of claims and the change
in wealth transfer incentives discussed earlier. We investigate four
classes of senior securities: straight bonds, convertible bonds,
straight preferred, and convertible preferred.
The daily mean prediction errors and the cumulative sum of the pre-
diction errors are reported in Table 7; also included there are the num-
bers of each type of security which traded on each of the 21 days exam-
ined. In Table 8, we report statistics for various intervals and days
relative to the announcement date of the exchange (day 0). The inter-
pretation of the interval statistics is complicated by the fact that a
number of securities did not trade during the immediate announcement
period (days -1, 0). To capture a3 much information as possible about
the price reaction of these securities to the announcement, we report an
interval 'around day 0' which includes all senior securities in the sam-
ple. This interval extends from the last trading day prior to day -1
through the first trading day on or after day 0.
The mean cumulative prediction error around day is 0.000 for
straight debt, -0.005 for the convertible debt, -0.006 for straight pre-
ferred, and -0.020 for convertible preferred. Of the four, only the CPE
for the convertible preferred is statistically significant (test-statis-
tic, -U.80), and evidence of the negative revaluation of the convertible
- 17 -
preferred is present in each of the intervals examined. While not al-
ways statistically significant, the cumulative excess returns to both
forms of preferred stock are negative for all of the intervals, while
those for straight debt are non-negative for all except day 0.
The only evidence of a possible wealth transfer between common
stock and straight debt occurs in the interval from day -10 through day
0, when the cumulative average excess return for straight debt is 0.004
(test-statistic, 3-16), and that for the common is -0.019 (test-statis-
tic, -1.72). Since most of the positive effect for the straight debt
occurs during the early days of the interval, i.e. during the period
from day -10 to day -5, the increase does not appear to be related to
1
7
the announcement of the exchange. ' Overall, there does not appear to be
evidence of a wealth transfer between the security classes over the 21
day interval from t=-10,+10, especially since the common stock CPE has
recovered to pre-event levels by day +10.
Further information about the sample distribution of senior securi-
ty returns is provided in Table 9. Here, we look more closely at the
interval around day 0, and present frequency distributions and ranges
for each security type. While there is substantial variation in indi-
We find the results for the straight preferred surprising; a priori,
we expected it to behave in a fashion similar to the straight debt,
i.e. a non-negative response to the exchange. This expectation was
based upon the increased relative priority of the preferred after the
exchange, and the lower expected bankruptcy costs. The evidence,
however, indicates that the negative response to the exchange was
quite general; for example, in Table 7, 17 of the 21 daily prediction
errors are negative, and in Table 8, all of the intervals reported
have negative cumulative daily prediction errors (IPE's).
1
7
A possible explanation of the positive excess returns to the debt is
that they may be associated with the open market purchases of bonds
by the investment bankers who have arranged the exchange.
- 18 -
vidual security returns within each group, the table indicates that the
two classes of preferred stock had a more negative response to the ex-
change announcement than did the two classes of debt. In fact, the
overall reaction of the preferred stock is very similar to that of the
common stock around the announcement. This trend is obvious both in the
magnitudes of the £?E's, and in the percentages of securities with neg-
ative £PE's. 18
The results reported above are on the aggregate behavior of each
class of senior securities in the sample. As a final step in the analy-
sis', we examined the potential wealth transfers at the firm level by
matching the announcement period abnormal returns on each firm's equity
19
with that of its own senior securities. J The correlation coefficients
of common stock abnormal returns with those of each of the senior secur-
ities were then computed. The coefficients are -.0651 for straight
debt, +.3397* for convertible debt, +.0767 for straight preferred, and
+.3544* for convertible preferred (*indicates significance at .05).
These results are more consistent with priors than those reported above
since the two convertible senior securities decline in value along with
the equity, while the two non-convertible senior securities do not have
a significant change in value. This evidence is not consistent with a
transfer of wealth among security classes, but it is consistent with an
overall reduction in firm value associated with the announcement of an
equity for debt exchange.
1
8
That 69% of both the straight and convertible preferred issues had
negative PE's is strikingly consistent with the 69% and 67% negative
equity returns reported in Tables 4 and 5.
1
9
The event interval abnormal return for each common stock wa3 matched
with the abnormal return around day for senior securities.
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In conclusion, tne evidence presented in this section does not sup-
port the existence of a wealth transfer from common stock holders to
holders of senior securities, nor among the various classes of senior
securities. There is evidence, however, in both the aggregate, and' at
the firm level, of a reduction in firm value which results from the an-
nouncement of an equity for debt exchange.
5.M Pure and Mixed Capital Structure Changes
The majority of the transactions in the sample were pure capital
structure changes wherein only new common equity was exchanged for debt.
There were a number of firms, however, which used a combination of cash
and common stock to facilitate the exchange. Such a mixed transaction
is different from a pure capital structure change in several ways: 1)
the level of assets is reduced, 2) the decline in financial leverage is
moderated, and 3) there is less dilution of the position of existing
shareholders. The two types of exchange are equivalent, however, in
20their reduction in interest tax shields. In an attempt to discern
among the alternative factors which affect firm value, the sample was
partitioned into pure and mixed exchanges, and excess returns were com-
puted for each group. The results are summarized in Table 10.
The patterns of excess returns are quite different for the two
groups; the CPE for the mixed transactions exceeds that for the pure ex-
changes throughout the 81 day period of analysis, and the CPE for the
mixed group never falls below. 0.00. There were also different valuation
20
Those firms in the mixed exchange group may also be sending a differ-
ent signal to the market than those in the pure exchange group.
These signals might relate to reinvestment opportunities, potential
reversal of the capital structure change, etc.
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reactions to the exchange announcement for the groups; the reaction of
the pure exchange group was more significantly negative, both during the
two-day announcement period, and during the event interval. In addi-
21
tion, the post event recovery for the mixed group is larger.
There are several other characteristics of the group which used
cash in the exchange which are worth noting. First, when cash was used,
there was a strong tendency to use it for roughly 50$ of the trans-
22
action. Second, only one-half of the firms in the mixed exchange group
had negative abnormal stock returns associated with the announcement of
the exchange. Finally, there was not a systematic relationship between
the proportion of cash used and the abnormal return on that trans-
action. J
While the small sample size for the mixed group makes it difficult
to draw clear conclusions from this analysis, the results reported here
are consistent with several of the valuation implications discussed ear-
lier: (i) the reduction in tax shields has a negative impact on firm
value, (ii) the larger number of shares issued in a pure exchange rela-
tive to a mixed exchange has a negative impact on 3hare prices; this
might result from both the price pressure effect and the greater dilu-
21
Because of the small sample size, we examined the results for indi-
vidual firms in the cash group, and found that the reported results
were general.
22
In 72$ of the mixed transactions, the proportion of cash was within
the range of -47-53$ of the exchange. As mentioned earlier in the pa-
per, 50$ cash is the generally accepted guideline for the transaction
to qualify for tax-preferred treatment.
^ The correlation coefficient of the event interval CPE and the propor-
tion of cash used in the exchange i3 not significantly different than
zero.
- 21 -
pil
tion of shareholder's positions, and (iii) a pure exchange signals
different information than does a mixed exchange.
6. SUMMARY
This paper examines the impact on security prices of an equity for
debt exchange. Common stockholders earn significantly negative abnormal
returns during both the two-day announcement period and the event inter-
val which extends from the earliest event-related day through the day of
the exchange. This result is consistent with most previous studies of
the wealth effects of capita.7 structure change. We report two addition-
al findings which are not consistent with prior research, however.
First, we find evidenoe that a portion of the decrease in common stock
price results from a prioe pressure effect, implying that the demand
curve for shares is downward sloping. Secondly, we find that the neg-
ative effect on common stook value is only temporary, and that abnormal
returns in the post-event period are significantly positive.
We also exarainti the returns to four classes of senior securities
around the announcement of tne exchange. There are generally negative
abnormal returns to both olc.sses of preferred stockholders, however,
only those to the convertible preferred are significant. Overall, there
are no significant changes ui zhe value of debt securities, and there-
fore, no evidence of wealth transfers among the security classes. The
results are consistent with an overall decrease in firm value at the an-
nouncement of the exchange.
24
The absence of a systematio relationship between the proportion of
cash and abnormal return^ is n°t consistent with the dilution effect.
- 22 -
Finally, we examine the results for two sub-groups within the
sample, pure exchanges and those where ca3h was used along with equity,
and find notable differences. The reaction of the cash group to the an-
nouncement was less negative, and the post-event recovery for the group
was more robust.
In conclusion, we find aquity for debt exchanges to be associated
with a decrease in firm va.lie in the interval immediately around the
first publia announcement . Despite widely cited 'improvements' in ac-
counting results for the cu-re.nt period, security holders experienced at
least a short-term decrease :.n wealth. This decrease i3 consistent with
most prior studies of the iir.pact of capital structure change on firm
value. Unlike previous studies, however, we find the negative revalua-
tion of the common stock to >e only temporary. Of the hypotheses exam-
ined, none is consistent witi thi3 price pattern, therefore, the cause
of this pattern remains an unanswered question.
- 23 -
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TABLE 1
Characteristics of the sample of 150 equity for debt
exchanges by size, financial leverage, and exchange type
A. Size distribution of transactions (S), where size is the
number of nsw shares as a percentage of pre-exchange equity
S N
3 . ,0
10 S .08
08 S .06
06 S .04
04 s .02
02 s 00
2
2 Maximum 14.80$
4 Minimum .03
13 Mean 2.11
31
98
150
fl. Financial leverage of exchanging firms as measured by
the book ra .io of debt to total assets.
Quartile pebt Ratio
1 .364 - .508
2 ,509 - .585
3 .586 - .683
4 .684 - .980
C. Classification by type of exchange.
Number
Pure Exchanges (no ca3h) 19
Mixed Exchanges (ca: h and equity) 131
Total 150
TABLE 2
Daily prediction errors (PE) and the cumulative prediction
errors (CPE) around the first announcement (day 0) of
equity for debt exchanges.
Day PE CPE
-50 0.0014 0.0014
-40 0.0005 -0.0050
-30 0.0009 0.0001
-20 0.0010 0.0052
-10 -0.0009 .0.0083
- 9 -0.0018 0.0065
- 8 0.0008 0.0073
- 7 0.0005 0.0078
- 6 0.0012 0.0089
- 5 0.0001 0.0090
- 4 -0.0008 0.0083
- 3 -0.0004 0.0078
- 2 -0.0040 0.0039
-0.0060 -0.0021
-0.0068 -0.0089
1 0.0009 -0.0081
2 -0.0001 -0.0082
3 0.0004 -0.0077
4 -0.0003 -0.0080
5 0.0001 -0.0079
6 0.0032 -0.0047
7 0.0038 -0.0009
8 0.0028 0.0019
9 0.0013 0.0032
10 0.0024 0.0056
20 0.0013 0.0030
30 0.0012 0.0117
TABLE 3
Mean CPE' 3 for various intervals around the first
announcement date and the corresponding test-statistics
Days In Interval CPE
-50 to -0.009
-10 to -0.0181
-5 to Q -0.0178
-1 to -0.0128
1 to 5 0.001
1 to 10 0.0145
t-statistic
-0.86
-4.15
-5.76
-7.18
0.37
3-35
TABLE 4
Distribution of the two-day (-1,0) announcement period
CPE's for the sample of equity for debt exchanges.
CPE N
. 10 > CPE 1
.08 > CPE > -.10 3
.06 > CPE > -.08 6
.04 > CPE > -.06 9
.02 > CPE > -.04 38
.00 : CPE > -.02 46
103
02 > CPE > .00 33
.04 , CPE > .02 8
.06 CPE > .04 4
.08 CPE > .06 3
47
150
Maximum .0684
Minimum -.1178 **v
i
Mean -.0128
Percent negative 68.7%
TABLE 5
Distribution of the event interval common stock cumulative
abnormal returns for the sample of equity for debt exchanges
CPE N
-.10 > CPE 5
-.08 > CPE > -.10 1
-.06 CPE > -.08 8
-.en > 'PE > -.06 14
-.02 > PE > -.04 35
.CO > - PE > -.02 37
100
.02 > PE > .00 31
,QK > PE > .02 12M > PE > .04 3
.06 > PE > .06 2
.10 > PE > .08 1
PE > .10 1
50
150
Maximum .1047
Minimum -.1245
Mean -.0150 (Z=-5.670)
Pe-cent Negative 66.7$
TABLE 6
Result3 of the regression of the event interval cumulative
prediction errors (CPE.) en the size (S. ) of the transaction
for 150 equity for debt exchanges, (test-statistics in parentheses)
CPEj^ = Y0 + Y^ + e.
Y0
Ordinary Least Squares -1.02
(«>.41)
Weighted Least Squares 0.71
( -.95)
Y1 R
2
-0.19 .014
(-1.39)
-0.29 .139*
(-1.92)
p
*R i3 adjusted for the suppression of the intercept
TABLE 7
Daily average prediction errors (PE) and cumulative sum of the
daily average preciction errors (EPE) for senior securities.
N is the number of issues traded on each day.
Straight Convertible Straight Convertible
Debt Debt Preferred Preferred
Day(s) PE EPE N PE EPE N PE E_PE N PE EPE N
-10 0.004 0.004 133 -0.00: -0.003 28 -0.002 -0.002 33 -0.008 -0.008 34
-9 0.003 0.007 121 -0.001 -0.004 24 -0.005 -0.007 33 0.000 -0.007 36
-8 0.000 0.007 123 0.001 -0.002 2S -0.002 -0.009 34 0.014 0.007 37
-7 0.004 0.011 124 -0.003 -0.005 29 -0.005 -0.014 36 0.002 0.008 37
-6
-0.003 0.007 128 0.006 0.001 31 0.005 -0.009 29 -0.002 0.006 37
-5 0.001 0.008 134 0.001 0.002 25 -0.009 -0.018 30 0.003 0.009 40
-4
-0.000 0.008 120 -0.005 -0.004 28 -0.001 -0.019 33 0.001 0.010 37
-3 -0.001 0.007 131 -0.000 -0.004 30 0.003 -0.016 32 0.001 0.011 34
-2 0.000 0.007 H1 -0.006 -0.010 32 -0.004 -0.020 32 -0.008 0.003 29
-1 0.002 0.008 1 ;8 0.004 -0.006 28 -0.001 -0.020 33 -0.011 -0.008 41
-0.001 0.008 131 0.001 -0.005 24 -0.003 -0.023 32 -0.014 -0.022 35
1 -0.000 0.007 131 -0.003 -0.008 27 -0.010 -0.033 29 -0.009 -0.030 42
2 0.000 0.008 134 -0.Q01 -0.010 27 -0.003 -0.036 33 -0.001 -0.032 41
3 -0.003 0.004 134 0.000 -0.009 24 0.000 -0.036 32 -0.004 -0.036 41
4 -0.003 0.002 127 0.002 -0.007 26 -0.001 -0.037 36 0.003 -0.033 31
5 0.000 0.002 12:8 -0.006 -0.013 23 -0.006 -0.043 33 0.000 -0.033 35
6 0.004 0.005 140 0.002 -0.011 30 -0.006 -0.043 35 0.001 -0.029 32
7 0.001 0.006 119 -0.002 -0.013 21 -0.003 -0.051 35 0.003 -0.029 32
3 -0.001 0.005 129 0.004 -0.009 26 0.002 -0.049 30 0.004 -0.025 34
9 -0.001 0.004 131 -0.001 -0.010 30 -0.003 -0.052 26 0.005 -0.020 37
10 0.002 0.006 124 -0.002 -0.012 25 -0.000 -0.052 31 -0.006 -0.026 34
TABLE 8
Cumulative average prediction errors (CPE) for senior
securities during various intervals around the exchange
announcement, and the corresponding test-statistics.
Straight Convert ible Stra ight Convert;ible
Debt Debt Preferred Preferred
Days in
Interval CPE t CPE t CPE t CPE t
-10 to 10 .003 2.54 -.008 -0.55 -.033 -2.65 -0.019 -1.78
-10 to .004 3.16 -.004 -0,13 -.015 -1.60 -0.014 -1.72
-4 to .000 1.44 -.005 -0.92 -.004 -0.19 -0.023 -3-92
-1 to .001 0.5? 004 1.14 -.003 0.09 -0.021 -4.99
-1 .002 1.0: ..004 1.56 -.001 0.72 -0.011 -2.92
-.001 -co: -001 -0.56 -.003 -0.73 -0.014 -3-96
Around .000 0.31 -.C05 -1.36 -.006 -0.9M -0.020 -4.80
Day
•
TABLE 9
Frequency distribution of the CPE for four classes of senior
securities during the event interval surrounding the first
public announcement of the equity for debt exchange.
Number of observations by type of security
Straight Convertible Straight Convertible
CPE Range Debt Debt Preferred Preferred
-.10 > CPE 1 1 1
-.08 > CPE > -.10 3 1 1 1
-.06 > CPE > -.08 4 1 1 4
-.04 > CPE > -.06 9 2 1 9
-.02 > CPE > -.04 26 9 7 14
.00 > CPE > -.02 78 8 24 7
.02 > CPE > .00 71 12 6 11
.04 > CPE > .02 23 3 6 2
.06 > CPE > .04 10 2 3 2
.08 > CPE > .06 4 2 1
.10 > CPE > .08 1
CPE > -.10 1 1
Maximum 0.111 0.079 0.068 0.126
Minimum -0.123 -0. 110 -0.111 -0.106
Mean -(.0004 -0.005 -0.0063 -0.0198
Percesnt Negative 525 54* 69* 69*
TABLE 10
Mean cumulative prediction errors for pure and mixed
exchanges for several intervals around the exchange
announcement (test-statistics in parentheses).
Day(s) i: Mixed Pure
Interval (Cash) (Non-Cash)
n = 19
.0265
n = 131
-50 to -.0001
0.92) (-0.09)
-10 to - 0050 -.0075
-0.71) (-1.66)
-5 to -.0055 -.0101
•0.53) (-2. 34)
-1 to - C079 -.0079
-2.12) (-4.55)
-.0043 -.0078
(-1.11) (-4.82)
1 to 10 .0133 .0069
(1.09) (1.55)
1 to 25 .0526 .0161
H.65) (2.05)
Event -.;.02 -.0140
Interval (-..28) (-4.77)


